Chapter 2: Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency
The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. Mao Zedong
Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. Sun Tzu
Separate definitions exist for resistance movements and insurgencies within the DOD and various academic communities. However, within this document, the two terms convey a strategy of insurrection. Planners broadly use the term “insurgency” to describe the concept of achieving aims through a strategy of armed conflict and subversion against an indigenous government or occupying power. Planners use the term “resistance movement” to convey a unique type of insurgency that focuses on the removal of an occupying power. The difference in terminology is important to the concept of UW, because planners must understand the significant differences in dealing with a resistance movement that forms in response to an occupying power, and an insurgency that grows over time out of discontent for an oppressive regime. Planners generically use the term “resistance” to categorize the activities of a resistance movement or insurgency.
Insurgents are inherently indigenous. There remains confusion regarding external support elements, such as foreign fighters. Even when the U.S. forces or foreign fighters support an insurgency or resistance movement, planners should not categorize them as part of the insurgency. Planners should categorize these elements as enablers, facilitators, advisors, or supporters.
WHY POPULATIONS RESIST
2-1. Resistance generally begins with the desire of individuals to remove intolerable conditions imposed by an unpopular regime or occupying power. Feelings of opposition toward the governing authority and hatred of existing conditions that conflict with the individual’s values, interests, aspirations, and way of life spread from the individual to his family, close friends, and neighbors. As a result, an entire community may possess an obsessive hatred for the established authority. Initially, this hatred will manifest as sporadic, spontaneous nonviolent and violent acts of resistance by the people toward authority. As the discontent grows, natural leaders, such as former military personnel, clergymen, local office holders, and neighborhood representatives, emerge to channel this discontent into organized resistance that promotes its growth. The population must believe they have nothing to lose, or more to gain. Key to transitioning from growing discontent to insurrection is the perception by a significant portion of the population that they have nothing to lose by revolting and the belief that they can succeed. In addition, there must be a spark that triggers insurrection, such as a catalyzing event that ignites popular support against the government power and a dynamic insurgent leadership that is able to exploit the situation. Figure 2-1, page 2-2, defines words critical to understanding resistance movements.
2-2. People who outwardly follow their normal mode of existence conduct clandestine resistance. This type of resistance is organized and controlled and conducts the following activities as groups and individuals:
Traffic in contraband.
2-3. Individuals and groups who train along military lines perform overt resistance. Planners refer to this militant arm of the resistance movement as the guerrilla force. These elements make no secret of their existence or their objectives. However, resistance leaders compartmentalize the specific relationship of the guerrilla force to other components of the resistance movement to prevent compromise of the entire movement.
2-4. Each insurgency or resistance movement has its own unique characteristics based upon its strategic objectives, operational environment, and available resources. Insurgencies normally seek to change the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. Typical insurgent goals include:
Removal of the established governing authority, whether an indigenous regime or occupying military power.
Establishment of an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state.
Extraction of political concessions that the movement cannot attain through nonviolent means.
2-5. The structure of an insurgency or resistance movement is similar to an iceberg (Figure 2-2, page 2-4). Most of the structure is below the surface, and only the peak is visible. In building a resistance structure, insurgent leaders give principal attention to the development of a clandestine supporting infrastructure. This infrastructure works—
Among the citizens in rural villages, towns, and urban cities.
Within the military, police, and administrative apparatus of government.
Among labor groups and students.
DYNAMICS OF SUCCESSFUL INSURGENCIES
2-6. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations, lists eight dynamics of an insurgency. JP 3-24 includes internal support and organizational and operational patterns. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, lists six dynamics of an insurgency. FM 3-24 does not include organization and operational patterns. However, SF continue to use organization as one of the dynamics of an insurgency to understand the form, function and logic of insurgent movements.
2-7. Seven dynamics are common to most successful insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework for planners to analyze insurgencies. It is some combination of these dynamics that will generally transform popular disconnect into an organized and effective movement.
2-8. A group committing random political violence is not an insurgency. In an insurgency, the group is committing directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction, guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. The insurgency leaders must make their cause known to the people and gain popular support. Their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government and to establish credibility for their movement. The leaders must replace the government’s Chapter 2 legitimacy with that of their own. Their ability to serve as a catalyst that motivates and inspires others to have faith in their cause is vital to the movement’s growth. Their ability to organize and willingness to distribute power across the organization is vital to the long-term success of the movement. Organizations dependent upon key charismatic personalities to provide cohesion and motivation for the movement are vulnerable to disruptions if the enemy removes or co-opts those players.
2-9. The insurgents must have a program that justifies its actions in relation to the movement’s grievances and explains what is wrong with the status quo. The most important aspect of a successful insurgency is the viability of the message. It is essential that the message physically reaches the people and possesses Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency meaning to their way of life. The insurgency cannot gain active or passive support without achieving these goals. This makes the language, culture, and geography of the masses particularly important. Ideology is an important factor in unifying the many divergent interests and goals among the insurgency membership. As a common set of interrelated beliefs, values, and norms, ideology is used to manipulate and influence the behavior of individuals within the group. Ideology will serve as the rallying call for all members of the population to join the struggle. The ideology of the insurgency and the motivation of the insurgent must remain linked. Once delinked, the counterinsurgent will be able to address individual grievances and negate the unity of the insurgency.
2-10. Although insurgency is a strategy, implementation requires intermediate objectives, specifically strategic, operational, and tactical goals. Tactical goals most directly translate to actions. These actions lead to operational goals. Insurgents need carefully to choose what efforts to undertake. For example, raids, ambushes, and supporting propaganda urging enemy forces to serve their tour quietly and go home alive, to consolidate into large bases away from the cities, or to stay to the roads for their own safety achieves the goals of disrupting enemy control over territory and weakening enemy commitment to counter insurgent strategy.
2-11. Operational objectives address how the insurgency will progress towards its strategic goal. Examples could include the following:
Attaining a level of popular support in a key region.
Gaining international recognition or external support.
2-12. The strategic objective is the desired end state. In general, the strategic objective is to gain concessions or remove the regime in power. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It might be the movement’s only clearly defined goal. Some examples of strategic goals are as follows:
ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY
2-13. The environment and geography (demographics) greatly affect an insurgency’s strategies and tactics. Insurgencies may form their base in urban environments, rural environments, or a combination of both. By maintaining a combination of urban cells and rural bases, insurgencies can often take full advantage of the benefits of both models (urban and rural) without becoming constrained by the shortcomings of either model.
2-14. Insurgents located in rural areas enjoy the relative safety of remote terrain or safe havens, such as jungles or mountains. These geographical conditions make it possible for them to form larger guerrilla bands and conduct large-scale guerrilla operations. Disadvantages of a rural base are—
Length and speed of communications and supply lines.
Displacement of insurgents from the populace.
Susceptibility of insurgents to conventional military counterguerrilla operations.
2-15. Urban insurgencies have overcome the lack of suitable restrictive terrain by operating within ethnic ghettos or enclaves within sympathetic densely populated urban areas. These areas often create safe havens that HN forces are unwilling or unable to access. This type of urban basing requires a high degree of compartmentalization, which makes it more difficult for the group to train and organize for large-scale operations. Chapter 2
2-16. Historically, insurgencies do not succeed without some form of external support. This support can be in the form of—
Moral or political support in the international forum.
Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, and training.
Sanctuary, such as secure training sites, operational bases over a border, or protection from extradition.
2-17. Governments providing support to an insurgency normally share beneficial interests or common ideology with the insurgency. Ethnic enclaves or diasporas in third-party countries can provide significant support in terms of political voice, money, personnel, and sanctuary.
2-18. With external support comes a degree of dependency on the foreign power. Insurgencies can view this as a disadvantage because the foreign power can then attempt to control or manipulate the insurgency to better serve its goals. To counterbalance the loss of the support from sympathetic foreign governments since the end of the Cold War, many groups have resorted to alliances with organized crime groups, narcotics trafficking, and kidnapping to raise funds. This tactic has proven extremely effective for generating revenue, but counterproductive to the original goals of the movements.
PHASING AND TIMING
2-19. Successful insurgencies pass through common phases of development. Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in different phases in separate regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return. A common failure of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is the inability to adapt tactics when transitioning from one phase of a strategy to another.
2-20. The three-phase construct presented below is a historical representation of how insurgencies mature. An extremely useful template allows planners to communicate precisely an insurgency’s stage of development.
Phase I—Latent or Incipient Phase
2-21. During this phase, the leadership of the resistance develops the clandestine supporting infrastructure upon which all future effort will rely. The resistance organization uses a variety of subversive techniques to prepare the population psychologically to resist. Some techniques include propaganda, demonstrations, boycotts, and sabotage. Subversive activities frequently occur in an organized pattern without any major outbreak of armed violence. Activities include the following:
Recruit, organize, and train cadre.
Infiltrate key government organizations and civilian groups.
Establish cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks.
Organize or develop cooperative relationships with legitimate political action groups, youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities.
Solicit and obtain funds.
Develop sources for external support.
2-22. An absent government will compromise with insurgent objectives. The goal is to prepare or transition the population into accepting overt military operations (guerrilla warfare) as permissible. The goal is to gain the support of the local population and weaken the power of the existing government. Although the operational goal is to win popular support, the tactical goal is to convince the local population to avoid collaboration with the government forces. This leads to a condition where the insurgency can expand operations without the risk of compromise by the local population. It is impossible Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency for the insurgency to conduct the operations it desires without the population being aware of it. This condition allows the insurgency to expand into Phase II (guerrilla warfare).
Phase II—Guerrilla Warfare
2-23. The objective of this phase is to degrade the government’s security apparatus (the military and police elements of national power) to the point where the government is susceptible to defeat.
2-24. A campaign of guerrilla attacks and sabotage degrade the government’s military and police forces. Subversive activities continue to build and maintain support from the population. Proinsurgency radio broadcasts, newspapers, and pamphlets openly challenge the control and legitimacy of established authority.
2-25. Unlike Phase I, in Phase II guerrillas need to gather forces, communicate and coordinate operations, conduct training, receive logistics, rest and hide after operations, and plan future operations. Their need for intelligence collection and security also increases in Phase II. As the guerrillas grow in numbers, so must the clandestine support mechanisms.
2-26. The resistance fighters or insurgents may achieve legal belligerent status from the international community if they meet the internationally accepted criteria.
Phase III—War of Movement
2-27. The goal of the insurgency in Phase III is to bring about the collapse of the established government (military or internal actions) or the withdrawal of the occupying power. The insurgency does not necessarily need to transform into a conventional military, but it must position itself to defeat the government or occupying power. For example, the insurgency might degrade the enemy’s capabilities to a point that an urban uprising against the presidential palace would topple the government. This tactic can only succeed if the insurgency effectively removes the military first.
2-28. As the insurgency gains control over the country, the insurgent leadership becomes responsible for the population, resources, and territory under its control. If the insurgency fails to plan and execute posthostility activities, the population may lose confidence in the insurgency and turn to the old government, a breakaway faction, or a splinter group of the insurgency.
2-29. Based on the conditions set earlier, an effective resistance or insurgency—
Establishes an effective civil administration.
Establishes an effective military organization.
Provides balanced social and economic development.
Mobilizes the population to support the resistance organization.
Protects the population from hostile actions.
Failure to achieve these objectives may cause the resistance movement to revert to an earlier phase.
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL PATTERNS
2-30. The organizational and operational pattern of a given movement is similar to its order of battle. From its outset, the organization has a concept of its development based on its goals. Although there are numerous traditional models for insurgencies (for example, conspiratorial, military-focused, urban, protracted popular war, or terror-based [not a methodology supported as a U.S. option]), the planner must avoid following a famous model without considering the way that model worked for its historical environment and if the model is appropriate for the current problem set. The structure of the organization largely depends on the available resources, security threat, and population distribution. All insurgencies are unique and rarely follow one model exclusively. It is unlikely the structure would resemble a uniform organization, such as the military, in which all units look relatively the same. Function takes precedence over form. Planners must understand the organization’s—
Various subordinate components and their orientation.
Commands—down to the lowest tactical level.
2-31. The organization’s most important component level is the local level, where it obtains and sustains support and manifests actions. Echelons above the local level coordinate all functions (political, military, external support, and so on). Overall command provides purpose and direction.
THE COMPONENTS OF AN INSURGENCY
2-32. There are three components of an insurgency. The underground is always present and is the first component of the insurgency to form. Goals and objectives of the insurgency will determine the level of development of the—
2-33. The underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement or insurgency that has the ability to conduct operations in areas that are inaccessible to guerrillas, such as urban areas under the control of the local security forces. The underground can function in these areas because it operates in a clandestine manner, which prevents it from receiving legal belligerent status under any international conventions. Examples of underground functions include the following:
Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.
Subversive radio stations.
Propaganda networks that control newspaper or leaflet print shops and/or Web pages.
Special material fabrication, such as false identification, explosives, weapons, and munitions.
Control of networks for moving personnel and logistics.
Individuals or groups that conduct acts of sabotage in urban centers.
Clandestine medical facilities.
2-34. Underground members normally are active members of the community, and their service is a product of their normal life or position within the community. They operate by maintaining compartmentalization and delegating most risk to their auxiliary workers. The functions of the underground largely enable the resistance movement to affect the urban areas.
2-35. The operation cell is usually composed of a leader and a few cell members operating directly as a unit (Figure 2-3, page 2-9). The intelligence cell is unique in that the cell leader seldom in direct contact with the members of the cell, and the members are rarely in contact with one another (Figure 2-4, page 2-9). Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency
2-36. The auxiliary refers to that portion of the population that provides active clandestine support to the guerrilla force or the underground. Members of the auxiliary are part-time volunteers that have value because of their normal position in the community. Soldiers should not think of the auxiliary as a separate organization but as a different type of individual providing specific functions as a component within an urban underground network or guerrilla force’s network. These functions can take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence collection. Auxiliary members may not know any more than how to perform their specific function or service that supports the network or component of the organization. In many ways, auxiliary personnel assume the greatest risk. They are also the most expendable element within the insurgency. Insurgent leaders sometimes use auxiliary functions to test a recruit’s loyalty before exposing him to other parts of the organization. Auxiliary functions are like embryonic fluid that forms a protective layer, keeping the underground and guerrilla force alive. Specific functions include the following:
Logistics procurement (all classes of supply).
Logistics distribution (all classes of supply).
Labor for special materiel fabrication.
Security and early warning for underground facilities and guerrilla bases.
Communications network staff, such as couriers and messengers.
Safe house management.
Logistics and personnel transport.
2-37. Parallel cells are frequently set up to support a primary cell (Figure 2-5). The auxiliary cell is commonly found in front groups or in sympathizers’ organizations. It contains an underground cell leader, assistant cell leaders, and members (Figure 2-6, page 2-11). The cells in series provide a division of labor in order to carry out functions, such as the manufacture of weapons, supply, escape and evasion, propaganda, and printing of newspapers. The task assigned to a particular cell must transition or carry over (depicted by arrows) to the next cell in order to accomplish the function in its entirety. For example, Cell 1 purchases certain items, cell 2 assembles the items, and cell 3 distributes the assembled item (Figure 2-7, page 2-11). Based on the assigned mission, cell members do not communicate directly with one another. However, cell leaders will communicate indirectly through intermediaries.
2-38. Guerrillas are the overt military component of a resistance movement or insurgency. As the individuals that engage the enemy in combat operations, guerrillas typically have a significant disadvantage in terms of training, equipment, and firepower. For all their disadvantages, guerrillas have one advantage that can offset this unfavorable balance—the initiative. In all his endeavors, the guerrilla commander must strive to maintain and protect this advantage. The guerrilla only attacks the enemy when he can generate a relative, if temporary, state of superiority. The guerrilla commander must avoid decisive engagements, thereby denying the enemy the opportunity to recover, regain their actual superiority, and use it against the guerrilla force. The guerrilla force is only able to generate and maintain the initiative advantage in areas where they have significant familiarity with the terrain and a connection with the local population that allows them to harness clandestine support.
2-39. Depending on the degree of control over the local environment, the size of guerrilla elements can range anywhere from squad to brigade-size groups or larger. In the early stages of an insurgency, the guerrilla force’s offensive capability might be limited to small standoff attacks. As the guerrilla force’s base of support from the population grows, its ability to challenge government security forces more openly with larger-scale attacks increases. At some point in an insurgency or resistance movement, the guerrillas may achieve a degree of parity with HN forces in certain areas. In these cases, units may start openly fighting, rather than as guerrilla bands. In well-developed insurgencies, formerly isolated pockets of resistance activity may eventually connect and create liberated territory, possibly even linking with a friendly or sympathetic border state.
2-40. It is important to use the term “guerrilla” accurately in order to distinguish between other types of irregular forces that might appear similar but are in fact something entirely different, such as militias, mercenaries, or criminal gangs. The DOD defines a guerrilla as someone who engages in guerrilla warfare. This definition is somewhat overly simple because people generally consider guerrilla warfare a tactic that any force, regular or irregular, can use. True guerrilla forces normally only exist, for an extended period, as part of a broader resistance movement or insurgency.
ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF AN INSURGENCY
2-41. There are additional elements that may be found in an insurgency. Some typical additional elements include the following:
Leadership and C2.
LEADERSHIP AND COMMAND AND CONTROL
2-42. Leadership is not a separate type of component as much as it is a function. The guerrilla or underground component generally performs this function.
2-43. A government-in-exile does not exist in every situation. A government-in-exile is normally present only in situations in which an element displaces a government from its country but the government remains recognized as the legitimate sovereign authority. Whether a government-in-exile does or does not exist, the insurgency will usually still report to some form of a shadow government in-country. Figure 2-8, page 2-13, depicts the structure of a resistance with a government-in-exile.
2-44. The shadow government is an organization the underground forms in occupied territory. Ideally, the shadow government can perform normal governmental functions in a clandestine manner and synchronize those functions with the resistance movement. The shadow government is critical because it exercises a degree of control, supervision, and accountability over the population at all levels (district, village, city, province, and so on), and further discredits and delegitimizes the existing government. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency
2-45. Area command is a term planners use to denote the resistance leadership that directs, controls, integrates, and supports all resistance activities in a region. The area commander’s location should be a place where he can safely control the insurgency and its activities. Flexibility, intelligence, mobility, and operations security are essential for survival and success. If the insurgency subdivides the area command into sector commands, its component units are the subordinate sector commands.
INFRASTRUCTURE OF A RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OR INSURGENCY
2-46. The infrastructure of a resistance movement or insurgency includes the area complex and the guerilla bases. Guerrilla bases may be further subdivided into the inner security zone, outer security zone, and insurgent logistics.
2-47. An area complex is a clandestine, dispersed network of facilities to support resistance activities in a given area. The area complex is contested territory or an area that contains clandestine supporting infrastructure. It is not liberated territory. It represents the insurgent’s area of operations (AO). Insurgent forces can maintain their clandestine infrastructure in the area complex. The clandestine infrastructure provides insurgent forces with a measure of freedom of movement and support. These areas overlay areas under the control of the government or occupying military. These areas can eventually transform into liberated areas if the enemy’s ability to challenge the insurgent forces degrades to a level of parity with the guerrilla forces. To support resistance activities, an area complex must include a security system, guerrilla bases, communications, logistics, medical facilities, and a series of networks capable of moving personnel and supplies. The area complex may consist of friendly villages or towns under guerrilla military or political control (Figure 2-9, page 2-14).
2-48. A guerrilla base is an encampment that affords the guerrilla force the ability to rest, recuperate, plan, and train. Guerrilla bases may be temporary or semipermanent camps. Their level of complexity is proportional to the surrounding security situation. The security situation is a combination of the ability of the guerrillas to receive warning of an enemy advance, the ability of the enemy to project force to the base area, and the ability of the guerrillas to conceal their signature from all means of enemy detection. Guerrilla leaders should locate bases in terrain that HN counterguerrilla forces cannot easily access, such as restrictive rural or urban terrain. In environments that lack suitable restrictive physical terrain, certain urban environments can serve as guerrilla base locations. Densely populated urban enclaves that are sympathetic to the guerrilla cause can present an obstacle to counterguerrilla forces. Unlike actual restrictive physical terrain that always restricts the enemy’s ability to attack, urban restrictive terrain only serves its purpose while counterguerrilla forces remain unwilling to assume the physical and political risk of entering the enclave. The security of the guerrilla camp comes from two bands of protection, which planners refer to as bizonal security (Figure 2-10, page 2-15).
Inner Security Zone
2-49. The inner security zone encompasses normal camp security measures found in any military encampment. These measures consist of static guard and sentry positions, flank observation posts, and roving patrols. These measures provide a layer of physical protection and early warning to the potential surprise of an advancing enemy patrol or attack. The security elements have a coordinated means of signaling and communicating with the main base, as well as clear instructions that dictate how they will respond to different threats. Bases have emergency procedures to respond to enemy attacks. These procedures include plans for rapid evacuation and withdrawal, as well as possible dispersal of the main body while a dedicated guerrilla element remains behind to temporarily delay any enemy penetration. Fighting positions, obstacles, command-detonated or personnel-initiated mines, preestablished ambush positions, mortars, explosives, or traps along probable enemy vehicular and personnel avenues of approach may support the defense plans. It is essential that the guerrillas avoid becoming decisively engaged while carrying out their delaying and defensive mission. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency
Outer Security Zone
2-50. Insurgent leaders develop and organize the auxiliary’s clandestine supporting infrastructure in the outer security zone. Clandestine LOCs connect the guerrilla base and other facilities within the area complex. The outer zone consists of multiple networks of auxiliary agents that provide passive and active surveillance of key enemy positions that would indicate a pending enemy operation, such as airfields, motor pools, army compounds, police stations, or choke points along major roadways. These auxiliary agents might also be in positions to observe indicators of pending offensive operations, such as the daily itineraries of key leaders, the absence of clientele at popular enemy recreation spots, or the arrival of new special units. Auxiliary personnel may also be in positions to monitor unsecured telephone and radio traffic, collect and sort the enemy’s trash, and take advantage of individual security force and soldier operational security awareness. Auxiliary members may also extort or intimidate enemy security personnel to procure operational information. Redundant collection methods and secure means of communications between auxiliary members and guerrilla bases provide the guerrillas with significant information that allows them to maintain the initiative over enemy security forces.
2-51. Each resistance organization must develop a logistics system to meet the specific requirements of their situation. In general, however, a resistance organization meets its logistical requirements through a combination of internal and external means.
2-52. The area complex must provide the bulk of an insurgent organization’s logistical requirements. The area commander must balance his support requirements against his need for civilian cooperation. Imposing excessive demands on the population may adversely affect popular support. Logistical constraints may initially dictate the size of the resistance organization.
2-53. As the resistance organization expands, its logistical requirements may exceed the capability of the area complex to provide adequate support. When this situation occurs, an external sponsor provides supplemental logistical support or the resistance organization reduces the scale of its activities. External support elements normally limit support to the necessities of life and the essential equipment and supplies the resistance needs to conduct combat operations. Internal sources of resistance supply include the following:
2-54. Successful offensive operations permit resistance forces to satisfy some of their logistical requirements through battlefield recovery. Capturing supplies from hostile forces also avoids alienating civilians. The resistance organization normally limits its purchases to critical items unavailable by other means. Excessive introduction of external currency may disrupt the local economy, which may not be in the interest of the resistance organization or the United States.
2-55. The resistance organization may organize a levy system to ensure an equitable system for obtaining supplies from the local population. Under a levy system, the resistance organization provides receipts and maintains records of levy transactions to facilitate reimbursement at the end of hostilities. Obstacles to a levy system include—
Chronic shortages among the local population.
Hostile populace and resources control (PRC) measures, including confiscation or destruction of local resources.
Competition from the hostile power or rival resistance organizations.
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) or other contamination of local resources.
2-56. Barter may adversely affect the levy system. However, it is sometimes the only method of obtaining critical services or items, such as medical supplies.
2-57. Resistance forces often have to improvise their own field expedients. They may even have to plant and raise their own food, dig wells, and tend their own livestock. The area commander may consider establishing clandestine factories to produce unobtainable items. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency
2-58. Confiscation alienates the local population. The resistance organization should use confiscation only in emergencies or as punishment for individuals who refuse to cooperate or who actively collaborate with the hostile power. In all cases, resistance leaders must strictly control confiscation to ensure that it does not deteriorate into looting.
2-59. The resistance organization requires basic medicines and other medical supplies to treat its members. Preventive medicine is especially important to a resistance organization because it normally does not have adequate facilities to treat diseases.
2-60. The area commander normally obtains transportation support from the auxiliary on a mission basis. The guerrilla force may have its own organic transportation system to meet its immediate needs. In remote or undeveloped areas, the primary means may be human porters or pack animals.
2-61. The area commander caches extra supplies and equipment throughout the operational area. Caching is not a haphazard affair. Caches must support anticipated operational requirements or specified emergencies.
2-62. The resistance organization obtains repair materiel from the local economy and through battlefield recovery to perform all maintenance and repairs within its capability. It may establish repair facilities within the area complex. The sponsor includes necessary maintenance and repair items with all equipment it provides the resistance. Introducing sophisticated equipment into the area complex may complicate the maintenance system.
ORGANIZATION OF MEDICAL SUPPORT WITHIN
THE AREA COMPLEX
2-63. The resistance initially confines clandestine medical treatment facilities to emergency and expedient care, with little preventive medicine. Once the area complex sufficiently develops, the clandestine facilities can expand and become a semipermanent medical organization, which serves the following purposes:
To sustain and preserve combat power.
To support the population.
2-64. If the area command has not established a degree of clandestine medical support, the result will be evident in the guerrilla force’s morale. Historically, a lack of proper medical attention has led to serious illness and disability that reduced overall unit combat effectiveness.
2-65. Medical elements supporting the resistance forces must be mobile, responsive, and effective in preventing disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. It is unlikely the movement will have a safe rear area where it can take casualties for treatment. Medical personnel help during combat operations by operating casualty collection points, which allows the healthy guerrillas to keep fighting. Medical personnel evacuate casualties from these points to a guerrilla base or civilian care facility.
2-66. Resistance personnel use existing logistics and transportation nets to gain supplies and move casualties. The movement of wounded personnel across enemy-controlled areas by auxiliary members is a clandestine operation, not a support function.
2-67. Trained medical personnel provide emergency treatment at aid stations. Evacuation of wounded personnel from the battle area begins at these stations. Because the condition of the wounded may prevent movement to the unit base, personnel hide them in secure locations and notify the auxiliary. The auxiliary cares for and hides the wounded or evacuates them to a treatment facility.
2-68. The evacuation of the dead is important for security reasons. If the enemy identifies the dead, the families of the guerrillas may be in danger. Personnel evacuate and cache the bodies of those killed in action Chapter 2 until proper burial or disposal of the bodies in accordance with (IAW) the customs of the local population. Removal and burial of the dead denies the enemy valuable intelligence concerning indigenous casualties.
2-69. A guerrilla hospital is a medical treatment facility (or complex of smaller facilities) that provides inpatient medical support to the guerrilla force. The resistance movement establishes a guerrilla hospital during the organization and buildup phase of its development. The hospital must be ready for operation at the start of combat operations and must be able to continue providing medical support until the leadership directs otherwise.
2-70. A guerrilla hospital rarely outwardly resembles a conventional hospital. The requirement for strict security, flexibility, and rapid mobility prevent visible comparison with conventional military or civilian medical facilities. As the guerrilla force consolidates its hold on the area complex, all medical support functions tends to consolidate. Safe areas allow the resistance to establish a centralized system of medical care. Sophisticated hospitals provide more elaborate care because they provide a wider selection of trained personnel and specialized equipment. These hospitals can also render more extensive and prolonged treatment.
2-71. The area where guerrilla forces send patients to recuperate is a convalescent facility. A guerrilla convalescent facility may be a safe house in which one or two convalescents are recuperating with an appropriate alibi or it could be in any base in guerrilla-controlled areas.
INSURGENT SUPPORT NETWORKS
2-72. Just like other large organizations, insurgencies need support networks. Insurgent support networks include the following:
Logistics support network.
Information and propaganda networks.
Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.
LOGISTICS SUPPORT NETWORK
2-73. Guerrillas need the ability to acquire, store, and distribute large quantities of supplies without standard lines of supply and communications. They accomplish this by maintaining a decentralized network of widely distributed caches instead of large centralized stockpiles. This minimizes the loss of materiel if a guerrilla base moves quickly or faces destruction. This network allows the guerrillas to conduct operations across a wide area without a long logistics tail.
2-74. The logistics supply network also includes facilities for materiel fabrication, such as false documentation, improvised explosives and munitions, and medical aid. If the resistance is receiving external support, this network will extend to clandestine airstrips, drop zones (DZ), seaports, and border-crossing sites.
2-75. Guerrillas and underground leaders need to communicate with their subordinate elements in an area where enemy forces are always actively looking and listening for any indicators that would compromise the location of guerrilla forces or their supporting mechanism. Because of the likelihood of a high early-warning threat, especially in the initial phases of the resistance movement, nontechnical communications should prevail. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency
INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA NETWORKS
2-76. Special networks are responsible for providing information to the population, against the will of the controlling regime. This information will bolster the will of the population to support the insurgent cause, undermine the legitimacy of the regime or occupying power, and undermine the morale of enemy security forces. Guerrilla forces may produce and distribute bootleg radio broadcasts, underground newspapers, Internet sites, and rumor campaigns. Guerrilla propaganda networks also draw new recruits to the movement. The networks may also coordinate with sympathetic elements outside the country to raise international favor and support. The resistance or insurgent leadership must have a degree of communication with the propaganda network to produce a coordinated effort.
2-77. The resistance requires the capability to move personnel and logistics safely through enemy controlled areas. Transportation networks include a compartmentalized series of safe houses or similar hiding locations. These locations allow the transport of personnel and materiel over long distances under the control of regional personnel who are familiar with the local enemy security measures. Security requires a complex series of recognition signals and communications that allow the individual segments to transfer the personnel and materiel safely with minimum exposure of either compartment to the other. These networks can also facilitate the evacuation of wounded personnel or personnel evading the enemy, such as downed airmen.
2-78. The insurgency requires new recruits to join all aspects of the movement. The incorporation of these individuals requires special security measures to prevent the compromise of the components. The insurgency often sequesters recruits until it can check the recruit’s validity and the recruit can complete training and possibly participate in an operation to prove his loyalty.
INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE NETWORKS
2-79. Aside from normal intelligence collection requirements, the resistance must recruit new members. The resistance screens new members to ensure they are not infiltrators. Further details are beyond the scope of this publication.