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Chapter 2: Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency

The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea. Mao Zedong

Secret operations are essential in war; upon them the army relies to make its every move. Sun Tzu

Separate definitions exist for resistance movements and insurgencies within the DOD and various academic communities. However, within this document, the two terms convey  a  strategy  of  insurrection.  Planners  broadly  use  the  term  “insurgency”  to describe  the  concept  of  achieving  aims  through  a  strategy  of  armed  conflict  and subversion against an indigenous government or occupying power. Planners use the term “resistance movement” to convey a unique type of insurgency that focuses on the removal of an occupying power. The difference in terminology is important to the concept  of  UW,  because  planners  must  understand  the  significant  differences  in dealing with a resistance movement that forms in response to an occupying power, and an insurgency that grows over time out of discontent for an oppressive regime. Planners  generically  use  the  term  “resistance”  to  categorize  the  activities  of  a resistance movement or insurgency.

Insurgents  are  inherently  indigenous.  There  remains  confusion  regarding  external support  elements,  such  as  foreign  fighters.  Even  when  the  U.S.  forces  or  foreign fighters  support  an  insurgency  or  resistance  movement,  planners  should  not categorize them as part of the insurgency. Planners should categorize these elements as enablers, facilitators, advisors, or supporters.


2-1.  Resistance generally begins with the desire of individuals to remove intolerable conditions imposed by an unpopular regime or occupying power. Feelings of opposition toward the governing authority and hatred of existing conditions that conflict with the individual’s values, interests, aspirations, and way of life spread from the individual to his family, close friends, and neighbors. As a result, an entire community may  possess  an  obsessive  hatred  for  the  established  authority.  Initially,  this  hatred  will  manifest  as sporadic,  spontaneous  nonviolent  and  violent  acts  of  resistance  by  the  people  toward  authority.  As  the discontent grows, natural leaders, such as former military personnel, clergymen, local office holders, and neighborhood representatives, emerge to channel this discontent into organized resistance that promotes its growth. The population must believe they have nothing to lose, or more to gain. Key to transitioning from growing  discontent  to insurrection is the perception by a significant portion of the population that they have nothing to lose by revolting and the belief that they can succeed. In addition, there must be a spark that triggers insurrection, such as a catalyzing event that ignites popular support against the government power and a dynamic insurgent leadership that is able to exploit the situation. Figure 2-1, page 2-2, defines words critical to understanding resistance movements.

Figure 2-1. Resistance terminology
Figure 2-1. Resistance terminology


2-2.  People who outwardly follow their normal mode of existence conduct clandestine resistance. This type  of  resistance  is  organized  and  controlled  and  conducts  the  following  activities  as  groups  and individuals:

  Political action.

  Propaganda.

  Espionage.

  Sabotage.

  Traffic in contraband.

  Intelligence gathering.


2-3.  Individuals and groups who train along military lines perform overt resistance. Planners refer to this militant  arm  of  the  resistance  movement  as  the  guerrilla  force.  These  elements  make  no  secret  of  their existence or their objectives. However, resistance leaders compartmentalize the specific relationship of the guerrilla  force  to  other  components  of  the  resistance  movement  to  prevent  compromise  of  the  entire movement.

2-4.  Each insurgency or resistance movement has its own unique characteristics based upon its strategic objectives,  operational  environment,  and  available  resources.  Insurgencies  normally  seek  to  change  the existing social order and reallocate power within the country. Typical insurgent goals include:

  Removal  of  the  established  governing  authority,  whether  an  indigenous  regime  or  occupying military power.

  Establishment of an autonomous national territory within the borders of a state.

  Extraction of political concessions that the movement cannot attain through nonviolent means.

2-5.  The  structure  of  an  insurgency  or  resistance  movement  is  similar  to  an  iceberg  (Figure  2-2, page 2-4). Most of the structure is below the surface, and only the peak is visible. In building a resistance structure,  insurgent  leaders  give  principal  attention  to  the  development  of  a  clandestine  supporting infrastructure. This infrastructure works—

  Among the citizens in rural villages, towns, and urban cities.

  Within the military, police, and administrative apparatus of government.

  Among labor groups and students.


2-6.  JP  3-24,  Counterinsurgency  Operations,  lists  eight  dynamics  of  an  insurgency.  JP 3-24  includes internal  support  and  organizational  and  operational  patterns.  FM  3-24,  Counterinsurgency,  lists  six dynamics of an insurgency. FM 3-24 does not include organization and operational patterns. However, SF continue to use organization as one of the dynamics of an insurgency to understand the form, function and logic of insurgent movements.

2-7.  Seven dynamics are common to most successful insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework for  planners  to  analyze  insurgencies.  It  is  some  combination  of  these  dynamics  that  will  generally transform popular disconnect into an organized and effective movement.


2-8.  A group committing random political violence is not an insurgency. In an insurgency, the group is committing directed and focused political violence.  It  requires  leadership  to  provide  vision,  direction, guidance,  coordination,  and  organizational  coherence.  The  insurgency  leaders  must  make  their  cause known to the people and gain popular support. Their key tasks are to break the ties between the people and the government and to establish credibility for their movement. The leaders must replace the government’s Chapter 2 legitimacy with that of their own. Their ability to serve as a catalyst that motivates and inspires others to have faith in their cause is vital to the movement’s growth. Their ability to organize and willingness to distribute power across the organization is vital to the long-term success of the movement. Organizations dependent upon key charismatic personalities to provide cohesion and motivation for the movement are vulnerable to disruptions if the enemy removes or co-opts those players.

Figure 2-2. Structure of an insurgency or resistance movement
Figure 2-2. Structure of an insurgency or resistance movement


2-9.  The insurgents must have a program that justifies its actions in relation to the movement’s grievances and explains what is wrong with the status quo. The most important aspect of a successful insurgency is the viability  of  the  message.  It  is  essential  that  the  message  physically  reaches  the  people  and  possesses Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency meaning to their way of life. The insurgency cannot gain active or passive support without achieving these goals. This makes the language, culture, and geography of the masses particularly important. Ideology is an important factor in unifying the many divergent interests and goals among the insurgency membership. As a common set of interrelated beliefs, values, and norms, ideology is used to manipulate and influence the behavior of individuals within the group. Ideology will serve as the rallying call for all members of the population to join the struggle. The ideology of the insurgency and the motivation of the insurgent must remain  linked.  Once  delinked,  the  counterinsurgent  will  be  able  to  address  individual  grievances  and negate the unity of the insurgency.


2-10.  Although  insurgency  is  a  strategy,  implementation  requires  intermediate  objectives,  specifically strategic, operational, and tactical goals. Tactical goals most directly translate to actions. These actions lead to  operational  goals.  Insurgents  need  carefully  to  choose  what  efforts  to  undertake. For example, raids, ambushes, and supporting propaganda urging enemy forces to serve their tour quietly and go home alive, to consolidate into large bases away from the cities, or to stay to the roads for their own safety achieves the goals of disrupting enemy control over territory and weakening enemy commitment to counter insurgent strategy.

2-11.  Operational objectives address how the insurgency will progress towards its strategic goal. Examples could include the following:

  Attaining a level of popular support in a key region.

  Gaining international recognition or external support.

2-12.  The  strategic  objective  is  the  desired  end  state.  In  general,  the  strategic  objective  is  to  gain concessions or remove the regime in power. Typically, the strategic objective is critical to cohesion among insurgent groups. It might be the movement’s only clearly defined goal. Some examples of strategic goals are as follows:

  Political revolution.

  Political reformation.

  Succession.

  Preservation.

  Reversion.


2-13.  The environment and geography (demographics) greatly affect an insurgency’s strategies and tactics. Insurgencies may form their base in urban environments, rural environments, or a combination of both. By maintaining a combination of urban cells and rural bases, insurgencies can often take full advantage of the benefits of both models (urban and rural) without becoming constrained by the shortcomings of either model.

2-14.  Insurgents located in rural areas enjoy the relative safety of remote terrain or safe havens, such as jungles  or  mountains.  These  geographical  conditions  make  it  possible  for  them  to  form  larger  guerrilla bands and conduct large-scale guerrilla operations. Disadvantages of a rural base are—

  Length and speed of communications and supply lines.

  Displacement of insurgents from the populace.

  Susceptibility of insurgents to conventional military counterguerrilla operations.

2-15.  Urban insurgencies have overcome the lack of suitable restrictive terrain by operating within ethnic ghettos or enclaves within sympathetic densely populated urban areas. These areas often create safe havens that  HN  forces  are  unwilling  or  unable  to  access.  This  type  of  urban  basing  requires  a  high  degree  of compartmentalization,  which  makes  it  more  difficult  for  the  group  to  train  and  organize  for  large-scale operations. Chapter 2


2-16.  Historically, insurgencies do not succeed without some form of external support. This support can be in the form of—

  Moral or political support in the international forum.

  Resources, such as money, weapons, food, advisors, and training.

  Sanctuary,  such  as  secure  training  sites,  operational  bases  over  a  border,  or  protection  from extradition.

2-17.  Governments  providing  support  to  an  insurgency  normally  share  beneficial  interests  or  common ideology with the insurgency. Ethnic enclaves or diasporas in third-party countries can provide significant support in terms of political voice, money, personnel, and sanctuary.

2-18.  With external support comes a degree of dependency on the foreign power. Insurgencies can view this as a disadvantage because the foreign power can then attempt to control or manipulate the insurgency to better serve its goals. To counterbalance the loss of the support from sympathetic foreign governments since  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  many  groups  have  resorted  to  alliances  with  organized  crime  groups, narcotics  trafficking,  and  kidnapping  to  raise  funds.  This  tactic  has  proven  extremely  effective  for generating revenue, but counterproductive to the original goals of the movements.


2-19.  Successful  insurgencies  pass  through  common  phases  of  development.  Not  all  insurgencies experience  every  phase,  and  progression through all phases is not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in different phases in separate regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return.  A  common  failure of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies is the inability to adapt tactics when transitioning from one phase of a strategy to another.

2-20.  The three-phase construct presented below is a historical representation of how insurgencies mature. An  extremely  useful  template  allows  planners  to  communicate  precisely  an  insurgency’s  stage  of development.

Phase I—Latent or Incipient Phase

2-21.  During this phase, the leadership of the resistance develops the clandestine supporting infrastructure upon which all future effort will rely. The resistance organization uses a variety of subversive techniques to prepare  the  population  psychologically  to  resist.  Some  techniques  include  propaganda,  demonstrations, boycotts, and sabotage. Subversive activities frequently occur in an organized pattern without any major outbreak of armed violence. Activities include the following:

  Recruit, organize, and train cadre.

  Infiltrate key government organizations and civilian groups.

  Establish cellular intelligence, operational, and support networks.

  Organize  or  develop  cooperative  relationships  with  legitimate  political  action  groups,  youth groups, trade unions, and other front organizations. This approach develops popular support for later political and military activities.

  Solicit and obtain funds.

  Develop sources for external support.

2-22.  An  absent  government  will  compromise  with  insurgent  objectives.  The  goal  is  to  prepare  or transition  the  population  into  accepting overt military operations (guerrilla warfare) as permissible. The goal  is  to  gain  the  support  of  the  local  population  and  weaken  the  power  of  the  existing  government. Although  the  operational  goal  is  to  win  popular  support,  the  tactical  goal  is  to  convince  the  local population  to  avoid  collaboration  with  the  government  forces.  This  leads  to  a  condition  where  the insurgency can expand operations without the risk of compromise by the local population. It is impossible Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency for  the  insurgency  to  conduct  the  operations  it  desires  without  the  population  being  aware  of  it.  This condition allows the insurgency to expand into Phase II (guerrilla warfare).

Phase II—Guerrilla Warfare

2-23.  The objective of this phase is to degrade the government’s security apparatus (the military and police elements of national power) to the point where the government is susceptible to defeat.

2-24.  A campaign of guerrilla attacks and sabotage degrade the government’s military and police forces. Subversive  activities  continue  to  build  and  maintain  support  from  the  population.  Proinsurgency  radio broadcasts,  newspapers,  and  pamphlets  openly  challenge  the  control  and  legitimacy  of  established authority.

2-25.  Unlike Phase I, in Phase II guerrillas need to gather forces, communicate and coordinate operations, conduct training, receive logistics, rest and hide after operations, and plan future operations. Their need for intelligence collection and security also increases in Phase II. As the guerrillas grow in numbers, so must the clandestine support mechanisms.

2-26.  The  resistance  fighters  or  insurgents  may  achieve  legal  belligerent  status  from  the  international community if they meet the internationally accepted criteria.

Phase III—War of Movement

2-27.  The goal of the insurgency in Phase III is to bring about the collapse of the established government (military  or  internal  actions)  or  the  withdrawal  of  the  occupying  power.  The  insurgency  does  not necessarily  need  to  transform  into  a  conventional  military,  but  it  must  position  itself  to  defeat  the government or occupying power. For example, the insurgency might degrade the enemy’s capabilities to a point that an urban uprising against the presidential palace would topple the government. This tactic can only succeed if the insurgency effectively removes the military first.

2-28.  As the insurgency gains control over the country, the insurgent leadership becomes responsible for the  population,  resources,  and  territory  under  its  control.  If  the  insurgency  fails  to  plan  and  execute posthostility  activities,  the  population  may  lose  confidence  in  the  insurgency  and  turn  to  the  old government, a breakaway faction, or a splinter group of the insurgency.

2-29.  Based on the conditions set earlier, an effective resistance or insurgency—

  Establishes an effective civil administration.

  Establishes an effective military organization.

  Provides balanced social and economic development.

  Mobilizes the population to support the resistance organization.

  Protects the population from hostile actions.

Failure to achieve these objectives may cause the resistance movement to revert to an earlier phase.


2-30.  The organizational and operational pattern of a given movement is similar to its order of battle. From its  outset,  the  organization  has  a  concept  of  its  development  based  on  its  goals.  Although  there  are numerous  traditional  models  for  insurgencies  (for  example,  conspiratorial,  military-focused,  urban, protracted popular war, or terror-based [not a methodology supported as a U.S. option]), the planner must avoid  following  a  famous  model  without  considering  the  way  that  model  worked  for  its  historical environment and if the model is appropriate for the current problem set. The structure of the organization largely depends on the available resources, security threat, and population distribution. All insurgencies are unique and rarely follow one model exclusively. It is unlikely the structure would resemble a uniform  organization, such as the military, in which all units look relatively the same. Function takes precedence over form. Planners must understand the organization’s—

  Various subordinate components and their orientation.

  Commands—down to the lowest tactical level.

  Supporting infrastructure.

2-31.  The organization’s most important component level is the local level, where it obtains and sustains support and manifests actions. Echelons above the local level coordinate all functions (political, military, external support, and so on). Overall command provides purpose and direction.


2-32.  There are three components of an insurgency. The underground is always present and is the first component of the insurgency to form. Goals and objectives of the insurgency will determine the level of development of the—

  Underground.

  Auxiliary.

  Guerrillas.


2-33.  The underground is a cellular organization within the resistance movement or insurgency that has the ability  to  conduct  operations  in  areas  that  are  inaccessible  to  guerrillas,  such  as  urban  areas  under  the control of the local security forces. The underground can function in these areas because it operates in a clandestine  manner,  which  prevents  it  from  receiving  legal  belligerent  status  under  any  international conventions. Examples of underground functions include the following:

  Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.

  Subversive radio stations.

  Propaganda networks that control newspaper or leaflet print shops and/or Web pages.

  Special material fabrication, such as false identification, explosives, weapons, and munitions.

  Control of networks for moving personnel and logistics.

  Individuals or groups that conduct acts of sabotage in urban centers.

  Clandestine medical facilities.

2-34.  Underground members normally are active members of the community, and their service is a product of their normal life or position within the community. They operate by maintaining compartmentalization and delegating most risk to their auxiliary workers. The functions of the underground largely enable the resistance movement to affect the urban areas.

2-35.  The operation cell is usually composed of a leader and a few cell members operating directly as a unit (Figure 2-3, page 2-9). The intelligence cell is unique in that the cell leader seldom in direct contact with the members of the cell, and the members are rarely in contact with one another (Figure 2-4, page 2-9). Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency

Figure 2-3. Operational cell
Figure 2-3. Operational cell
Figure 2-4. Intelligence cell
Figure 2-4. Intelligence cell


2-36.  The auxiliary refers to that portion of the population that provides active clandestine support to the guerrilla  force  or  the  underground.  Members  of  the  auxiliary  are  part-time  volunteers  that  have  value because of their normal position in the community. Soldiers should not think of the auxiliary as a separate organization but as a different type of individual providing specific functions as a component within an urban underground network or guerrilla force’s network. These functions can take the form of logistics, labor, or intelligence collection. Auxiliary members may not know any more than how to perform their specific function or service that supports the network or component of the organization. In many ways, auxiliary  personnel  assume  the  greatest  risk.  They  are  also  the  most  expendable  element  within  the insurgency. Insurgent leaders sometimes use auxiliary functions to test a recruit’s loyalty before exposing him to other parts of the organization. Auxiliary functions are like embryonic fluid that forms a protective layer, keeping the underground and guerrilla force alive. Specific functions include the following:

  Logistics procurement (all classes of supply).

  Logistics distribution (all classes of supply).

  Labor for special materiel fabrication.

  Security and early warning for underground facilities and guerrilla bases.

  Intelligence collection.

  Recruitment.

  Communications network staff, such as couriers and messengers.

  Propaganda distribution.

  Safe house management.

  Logistics and personnel transport.

2-37.  Parallel  cells  are  frequently  set  up  to  support  a  primary  cell  (Figure  2-5).  The  auxiliary  cell  is commonly found in front groups or in sympathizers’ organizations. It contains an underground cell leader, assistant cell leaders, and members (Figure 2-6, page 2-11). The cells in series provide a division of labor in  order  to  carry  out  functions,  such  as  the  manufacture  of  weapons,  supply,  escape  and  evasion, propaganda, and printing of newspapers. The task assigned to a particular cell must transition or carry over (depicted by arrows) to the next cell in order to accomplish the function in its entirety. For example, Cell 1 purchases certain items, cell 2 assembles the items, and cell 3 distributes the assembled item (Figure 2-7, page 2-11). Based on the assigned mission, cell members do not communicate directly with one another. However, cell leaders will communicate indirectly through intermediaries.

Figure 2-5. Parallel cells
Figure 2-5. Parallel cells
Figure 2-6. Auxiliary cell
Figure 2-6. Auxiliary cell
Figure 2-7. Cells in series
Figure 2-7. Cells in series


2-38.  Guerrillas  are  the  overt  military  component  of  a  resistance  movement  or  insurgency.  As  the individuals that engage the enemy in combat operations, guerrillas typically have a significant disadvantage in terms of training, equipment, and firepower. For all their disadvantages, guerrillas have one advantage that can offset this unfavorable balance—the initiative. In all his endeavors, the guerrilla commander must strive to maintain and protect this advantage. The guerrilla only attacks the enemy when he can generate a relative,  if  temporary,  state  of  superiority.  The  guerrilla  commander  must  avoid  decisive  engagements, thereby denying the enemy the opportunity to recover, regain their actual superiority, and use it against the guerrilla force. The guerrilla force is only able to generate and maintain the initiative advantage in areas where  they  have  significant  familiarity  with  the  terrain  and  a  connection  with  the  local  population  that allows them to harness clandestine support.

2-39.  Depending on the degree of control over the local environment, the size of guerrilla elements can range  anywhere  from  squad  to  brigade-size  groups  or  larger.  In  the  early  stages  of  an  insurgency,  the guerrilla force’s offensive capability might be limited to small standoff attacks. As the guerrilla force’s base of support from the population grows, its ability to challenge government security forces more openly with larger-scale attacks increases. At some point in an insurgency or resistance movement, the guerrillas may  achieve  a  degree  of  parity  with  HN  forces  in  certain  areas.  In  these  cases,  units  may  start  openly fighting,  rather  than  as  guerrilla  bands.  In  well-developed  insurgencies,  formerly  isolated  pockets  of resistance  activity  may  eventually  connect  and  create  liberated  territory,  possibly  even  linking  with  a friendly or sympathetic border state.

2-40.  It is important to use the term “guerrilla” accurately in order to distinguish between other types of irregular  forces  that  might  appear  similar  but  are  in  fact  something  entirely  different,  such  as  militias, mercenaries, or criminal gangs. The DOD defines a guerrilla as someone who engages in guerrilla warfare. This definition is somewhat overly simple because people generally consider guerrilla warfare a tactic that any force, regular or irregular, can use. True guerrilla forces normally only exist, for an extended period, as part of a broader resistance movement or insurgency.


2-41.  There are additional elements that may be found in an insurgency. Some typical additional elements include the following:

  Leadership and C2.

  Government-in-exile.

  Shadow government.

  Area command.


2-42.  Leadership  is  not  a  separate  type  of  component  as  much  as  it  is  a  function.  The  guerrilla  or underground component generally performs this function.


2-43.  A government-in-exile does not exist in every situation. A government-in-exile is normally present only in situations in which an element displaces a government from its country but the government remains recognized as the legitimate sovereign authority. Whether a government-in-exile does or does not exist, the insurgency will usually still report to some form of a shadow government in-country. Figure 2-8, page 2-13, depicts the structure of a resistance with a government-in-exile.


2-44.  The shadow government is an organization the underground forms in occupied territory. Ideally, the shadow government can perform normal governmental functions in a clandestine manner and synchronize those functions with the resistance movement. The shadow government is critical because it exercises a degree of control, supervision, and accountability over the population at all levels (district, village, city, province, and so on), and further discredits and delegitimizes the existing government. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency

Figure 2-8. Resistance structure with government-in-exile
Figure 2-8. Resistance structure with government-in-exile


2-45.  Area  command  is  a  term  planners  use  to  denote  the  resistance  leadership  that  directs,  controls, integrates, and supports all resistance activities in a region. The area commander’s location should be a place where he can safely control the insurgency and its activities. Flexibility, intelligence, mobility, and operations security are essential for survival and success. If the insurgency subdivides the area command into sector commands, its component units are the subordinate sector commands.


2-46.  The infrastructure of a resistance movement or insurgency includes the area complex and the guerilla bases.  Guerrilla  bases  may  be  further  subdivided  into  the  inner  security  zone,  outer  security  zone,  and insurgent logistics.


2-47.  An area complex is a clandestine, dispersed network of facilities to support resistance activities in a given  area.  The  area  complex  is  contested  territory  or  an  area  that  contains  clandestine  supporting infrastructure. It is not liberated territory. It represents the insurgent’s area of operations (AO). Insurgent forces  can  maintain  their  clandestine  infrastructure  in  the  area  complex.  The  clandestine  infrastructure provides insurgent forces with a measure of freedom of movement and support. These areas overlay areas under  the  control  of  the  government  or  occupying  military.  These  areas  can  eventually  transform  into liberated areas if the enemy’s ability to challenge the insurgent forces degrades to a level of parity with the guerrilla forces. To support resistance activities, an area complex must include a security system, guerrilla bases, communications, logistics, medical facilities, and a series of networks capable of moving personnel and  supplies.  The  area  complex  may  consist  of  friendly  villages  or  towns  under  guerrilla  military  or political control (Figure 2-9, page 2-14).

Figure 2-9. Area complex
Figure 2-9. Area complex


2-48.  A guerrilla base is an encampment that affords the guerrilla force the ability to rest, recuperate, plan, and  train.  Guerrilla  bases  may  be  temporary  or  semipermanent  camps.  Their  level  of  complexity  is proportional to the surrounding security situation. The security situation is a combination of the ability of the guerrillas to receive warning of an enemy advance, the ability of the enemy to project force to the base area, and the ability of the guerrillas to conceal their signature from all means of enemy detection. Guerrilla leaders  should  locate  bases  in  terrain  that  HN  counterguerrilla  forces  cannot  easily  access,  such  as restrictive  rural  or  urban  terrain.  In  environments  that  lack  suitable  restrictive  physical  terrain,  certain urban  environments  can  serve  as  guerrilla  base  locations.  Densely  populated  urban  enclaves  that  are sympathetic  to  the  guerrilla  cause  can  present  an  obstacle  to  counterguerrilla  forces.  Unlike  actual restrictive physical terrain that always restricts the enemy’s ability to attack, urban restrictive terrain only serves its purpose while counterguerrilla forces remain unwilling to assume the physical and political risk of entering the enclave. The security of the guerrilla camp comes from two bands of protection, which planners refer to as bizonal security (Figure 2-10, page 2-15).

Inner Security Zone

2-49.  The  inner  security  zone  encompasses  normal  camp  security  measures  found  in  any  military encampment.  These  measures  consist  of  static  guard  and  sentry  positions,  flank  observation  posts,  and roving patrols. These measures provide a layer of physical protection and early warning to the potential surprise  of  an  advancing  enemy  patrol  or  attack.  The  security  elements  have  a  coordinated  means  of signaling and communicating with the main base, as well as clear instructions that dictate how they will respond  to  different  threats.  Bases  have  emergency  procedures  to  respond  to  enemy  attacks.  These procedures include plans for rapid evacuation and withdrawal, as well as possible dispersal of the main body  while  a  dedicated  guerrilla  element  remains  behind  to  temporarily  delay  any  enemy  penetration. Fighting  positions,  obstacles,  command-detonated  or  personnel-initiated  mines,  preestablished  ambush positions, mortars, explosives, or traps along probable enemy vehicular and personnel avenues of approach may support the defense plans. It is essential that the guerrillas avoid becoming decisively engaged while carrying out their delaying and defensive mission. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency

Figure 2-10. Permanent base security
Figure 2-10. Permanent base security

Outer Security Zone

2-50.  Insurgent leaders develop and organize the auxiliary’s clandestine supporting infrastructure in the outer  security  zone.  Clandestine  LOCs  connect  the  guerrilla  base  and  other  facilities  within  the  area complex. The outer zone consists of multiple networks of auxiliary agents that provide passive and active surveillance  of  key  enemy  positions  that  would  indicate  a  pending  enemy  operation,  such  as  airfields, motor  pools,  army  compounds,  police  stations,  or  choke  points  along  major  roadways.  These  auxiliary agents might also be in positions to observe indicators of pending offensive operations, such as the daily itineraries of key leaders, the absence of clientele at popular enemy recreation spots, or the arrival of new special  units.  Auxiliary  personnel  may  also  be  in  positions  to  monitor  unsecured  telephone  and  radio traffic,  collect  and  sort  the  enemy’s  trash,  and  take  advantage  of  individual  security  force  and  soldier operational security awareness. Auxiliary members may also extort or intimidate enemy security personnel to procure operational information. Redundant collection methods and secure means of communications between  auxiliary  members  and  guerrilla  bases  provide  the  guerrillas  with  significant  information  that allows them to maintain the initiative over enemy security forces.

Insurgent Logistics

2-51.  Each resistance organization must develop a logistics system to meet the specific requirements of their situation. In general, however, a resistance organization meets its logistical requirements through a combination of internal and external means.

2-52.  The area complex must provide the bulk of an insurgent organization’s logistical requirements. The area commander must balance his support requirements against his need for civilian cooperation. Imposing excessive  demands  on  the  population  may  adversely  affect  popular  support.  Logistical  constraints  may initially dictate the size of the resistance organization.

2-53.  As the resistance organization expands, its logistical requirements may exceed the capability of the area  complex  to  provide  adequate  support.  When  this  situation  occurs,  an  external  sponsor  provides supplemental logistical support or the resistance organization reduces the scale of its activities. External support elements normally limit support to the necessities of life and the essential equipment and supplies the  resistance  needs  to  conduct  combat  operations.  Internal  sources  of  resistance  supply  include  the following:

  Battlefield recovery.

  Purchase.

  Levy.

  Barter.

  Production.

  Confiscation.

2-54.  Successful  offensive  operations  permit  resistance  forces  to  satisfy  some  of  their  logistical requirements  through  battlefield  recovery.  Capturing  supplies  from  hostile  forces  also  avoids  alienating civilians. The resistance organization normally limits its purchases to critical items unavailable by other means. Excessive introduction of external currency may disrupt the local economy, which may not be in the interest of the resistance organization or the United States.

2-55.  The resistance organization may organize a levy system to ensure an equitable system for obtaining supplies from the local population. Under a levy system, the resistance organization provides receipts and maintains records of levy transactions to facilitate reimbursement at the end of hostilities. Obstacles to a levy system include—

  Chronic shortages among the local population.

  Hostile populace and resources control (PRC) measures, including confiscation or destruction of local resources.

  Competition from the hostile power or rival resistance organizations.

  Chemical,  biological,  radiological,  nuclear,  and  high-yield  explosives  (CBRNE)  or  other contamination of local resources.

2-56.  Barter may adversely affect the levy system. However, it is sometimes the only method of obtaining critical services or items, such as medical supplies.

2-57.  Resistance forces often have to improvise their own field expedients. They may even have to plant and  raise  their  own  food,  dig  wells,  and  tend  their  own  livestock.  The  area  commander  may  consider establishing clandestine factories to produce unobtainable items. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency

2-58.  Confiscation alienates the local population. The resistance organization should use confiscation only in emergencies or as punishment for individuals who refuse to cooperate or who actively collaborate with the hostile power. In all cases, resistance leaders must strictly control confiscation to ensure that it does not deteriorate into looting.

2-59.  The resistance organization requires basic medicines and other medical supplies to treat its members. Preventive medicine is especially important to a resistance organization because it normally does not have adequate facilities to treat diseases.

2-60.  The area commander normally obtains transportation support from the auxiliary on a mission basis. The guerrilla force may have its own organic transportation system to meet its immediate needs. In remote or undeveloped areas, the primary means may be human porters or pack animals.

2-61.  The area commander caches extra supplies and equipment throughout the operational area. Caching is not a haphazard affair. Caches must support anticipated operational requirements or specified emergencies.

2-62.  The resistance organization obtains repair materiel from the local economy and through battlefield recovery  to  perform  all  maintenance  and  repairs  within  its  capability.  It  may  establish  repair  facilities within the area complex. The sponsor includes necessary maintenance and repair items with all equipment it provides the resistance. Introducing sophisticated equipment into the area complex may complicate the maintenance system.



2-63.  The resistance initially confines clandestine medical treatment facilities to emergency and expedient care, with little preventive medicine. Once the area complex sufficiently develops, the clandestine facilities can expand and become a semipermanent medical organization, which serves the following purposes:

  To sustain and preserve combat power.

  To support the population.


2-64.  If the area command has not established a degree of clandestine medical support, the result will be evident in the guerrilla force’s morale. Historically, a lack of proper medical attention has led to serious illness and disability that reduced overall unit combat effectiveness.

2-65.  Medical  elements  supporting  the  resistance  forces  must  be  mobile,  responsive,  and  effective  in preventing disease and restoring the sick and wounded to duty. It is unlikely the movement will have a safe rear area where it can take casualties for treatment. Medical personnel help during combat operations by operating  casualty  collection  points,  which  allows  the  healthy  guerrillas  to  keep  fighting.  Medical personnel evacuate casualties from these points to a guerrilla base or civilian care facility.

2-66.  Resistance  personnel  use  existing  logistics  and  transportation  nets  to  gain  supplies  and  move casualties. The movement of wounded personnel across enemy-controlled areas by auxiliary members is a clandestine operation, not a support function.


2-67.  Trained  medical  personnel  provide  emergency  treatment  at  aid  stations.  Evacuation  of  wounded personnel from the battle area begins at these stations. Because the condition of the wounded may prevent movement to the unit base, personnel hide them in secure locations and notify the auxiliary. The auxiliary cares for and hides the wounded or evacuates them to a treatment facility.

2-68.  The  evacuation  of  the  dead  is  important  for  security  reasons.  If  the  enemy  identifies  the  dead,  the families of the guerrillas may be in danger. Personnel evacuate and cache the bodies of those killed in action Chapter 2  until proper burial or disposal of the bodies in accordance with (IAW) the customs of the local population. Removal and burial of the dead denies the enemy valuable intelligence concerning indigenous casualties.


2-69.  A guerrilla hospital is a medical treatment facility (or complex of smaller facilities) that provides inpatient medical support to the guerrilla force. The resistance movement establishes a guerrilla hospital during the organization and buildup phase of its development. The hospital must be ready for operation at the start of combat operations and must be able to continue providing medical support until the leadership directs otherwise.

2-70.  A guerrilla hospital rarely outwardly resembles a conventional hospital. The requirement for strict security, flexibility, and rapid mobility prevent visible comparison with conventional military or civilian medical  facilities.  As  the  guerrilla  force  consolidates  its  hold  on  the  area  complex,  all  medical  support functions tends to consolidate. Safe areas allow the resistance to establish a centralized system of medical care. Sophisticated hospitals provide more elaborate care because they provide a wider selection of trained personnel  and  specialized  equipment.  These  hospitals  can  also  render  more  extensive  and  prolonged treatment.


2-71.  The  area  where  guerrilla  forces  send  patients  to  recuperate  is  a  convalescent  facility.  A  guerrilla convalescent  facility  may  be  a  safe  house  in  which  one  or  two  convalescents  are  recuperating  with  an appropriate alibi or it could be in any base in guerrilla-controlled areas.


2-72.  Just like other large organizations, insurgencies need support networks. Insurgent support networks include the following:

  Logistics support network.

  Communications networks.

  Information and propaganda networks.

  Transportation networks.

  Recruitment networks.

  Intelligence and counterintelligence networks.


2-73.  Guerrillas  need  the  ability  to  acquire,  store,  and  distribute  large  quantities  of  supplies  without standard  lines  of  supply  and  communications.  They  accomplish  this  by  maintaining  a  decentralized network  of  widely  distributed  caches  instead  of large centralized stockpiles. This minimizes the loss of materiel  if  a  guerrilla  base  moves  quickly  or  faces  destruction.  This  network  allows  the  guerrillas  to conduct operations across a wide area without a long logistics tail.

2-74.  The  logistics  supply  network  also  includes  facilities  for  materiel  fabrication,  such  as  false documentation, improvised explosives and munitions, and medical aid. If the resistance is receiving external support, this network will extend to clandestine airstrips, drop zones (DZ), seaports, and border-crossing sites.


2-75.  Guerrillas and underground leaders need to communicate with their subordinate elements in an area where enemy forces are always actively looking and listening for any indicators that would compromise the location of guerrilla forces or their supporting mechanism. Because of the likelihood of a high early-warning threat, especially in the initial phases of the resistance movement, nontechnical communications should prevail. Fundamentals of Resistance and Insurgency


2-76.  Special networks are responsible for providing information to the population, against the will of the controlling regime. This information will bolster the will of the population to support the insurgent cause, undermine the legitimacy of the regime or occupying power, and undermine the morale of enemy security forces.  Guerrilla  forces  may  produce  and  distribute  bootleg  radio  broadcasts,  underground  newspapers, Internet  sites,  and  rumor  campaigns.  Guerrilla  propaganda  networks  also  draw  new  recruits  to  the movement.  The  networks  may  also  coordinate  with  sympathetic  elements  outside  the  country  to  raise international  favor  and  support.  The  resistance  or  insurgent  leadership  must  have  a  degree  of communication with the propaganda network to produce a coordinated effort.


2-77.  The  resistance  requires  the  capability  to  move  personnel  and  logistics  safely  through  enemy controlled  areas.  Transportation  networks  include  a  compartmentalized  series  of  safe  houses  or  similar hiding locations. These locations allow the transport of personnel and materiel over long distances under the  control  of  regional  personnel  who  are  familiar  with  the  local  enemy  security  measures.  Security requires a complex series of recognition signals and communications that allow the individual segments to transfer  the  personnel  and  materiel  safely  with  minimum  exposure  of  either  compartment  to  the  other. These networks can also facilitate the evacuation of wounded personnel or personnel evading the enemy, such as downed airmen.


2-78.  The insurgency requires new recruits to join all aspects of the movement. The incorporation of these individuals  requires  special  security  measures  to  prevent  the  compromise  of  the  components.  The insurgency often sequesters recruits until it can check the recruit’s validity and the recruit can complete training and possibly participate in an operation to prove his loyalty.


2-79.  Aside from normal intelligence collection requirements, the resistance must recruit new members. The resistance screens new members to ensure they are not infiltrators. Further details are beyond the scope of this publication.

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